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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes we get called sick and sometimes we get called sacred, but no matter how
they name us we are a vitalpart of making this planet whok.1
Our society and laws allow a space for a multitude of identities and
forms of expression. Many kinds of differences are legally protected in various
ways, such as differences in race, religion, and gender. Sometimes protection
takes the form of requiring social institutions to adapt to the unique needs of
certain individuals or groups. Rights for disabled individuals, as exemplified
by the Americans with Disabilities Act,2 rest on the principle that impairment
disables because the world is structured around an incompatible model of
human ability; not because of a fundamental deficit within the individual. This
conception, termed the social model of disability, functions well for the para-
digmatic physical impairments such as a paraplegic in a wheelchair, but not all
impairments fall so neatly into this framework. While the social model of dis-
* J.D. 2007, University of Michigan Law School. I'd like to thank Professor Anna Kirk-
land and Professor Rebecca Eisenberg for their guidance and thoughtful contributions to my
Note. Thank you to Haley K. Krug for her generous time and effort, as well as to my class-
mates in the 2006 Fall Student Scholarship Workshop at Michigan Law for their help in aug-
menting this piece.
1. The Icarus Project, Underground Roots and Magic Spells: Visions for Resisting Monocultur and
Building Community, http://www.theicarusproject.net/artides/underground-roots-and-magic-
spells-visions-for-resisting-monoculture-and-building-community (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
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ability has been essential in the evolution of disability rights law, those who
are disabled by mental illness have been excluded from application of this
progressive model.3 There are many reasons proffered for such exclusion,
such as safety, and the so-called "right to cure."'4 Nevertheless, a more critical
look at the lives and experiences of individuals with mental illness reveals that
their legal disadvantages have more to do stigma, fear, and discrimination than
with altruistic goals, such as safety or a right to treatment. In a society in
which sanism5 reins, the medical model remains the lens through which the
law views the mentally ill. By taking the side of doctors who believe that the
mentally ill require medical treatment, lawyers and judges accept without ques-
tion the invisible oppression of sanist ideology.
I argue that the current medical model of mental illness is deeply insuffi-
cient for mentally ill litigants. Under the guise of objective knowledge-that is, a
psychiatric diagnosis-the medical model as it is applied in the law fails to rec-
ognize the dignity in the identities of the mentally ill and thereby perpetuates,
if not worsens, their collective denigration as members of society.
Besides ignoring the potentially substantial role that social structures play
in shaping the life of a mentally ill person, such as access to health services
and employment, the medical model is particularly troubling in the case of a
psychiatric patient as a litigant. Physical disabilities are much more likely than
mental disease to have an agreed upon diagnosis, course of treatment and
expected recovery time within the medical field.6 Furthermore, studies have
shown that psychiatrists tend to err on the side of safety when predicting out-
comes such as dangerousness, an important (though not necessarily decisive)
issue in cases dealing with the liberty interests of a person with mental illness,
such as civil commitment cases.' In fact, the American Psychological Associa-
tion published guidelines to aid legislatures in creating civil commitment stat-
utes that did not even include danger to self or others as a necessary or rec-
ommended requirement for involuntary confinement. 8 Since courts typically
3. Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafing through the Lens of Mental Disabili. 41 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 181, 193 (2005) ("While it can be argued that 'over time, this medical model of dis-
ability is being replaced'.. . with respect to mental disability, the prevailing zeitgeist in psychia-
try is still rooted in the medical model, focusing on diagnostic approaches and biological expla-
nations at the expense of social explanations.") (citations omitted).
4. MIcHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABIITY LAw (1999).
5. Legal scholar and Professor of Law Michael Perlin defines "sanism" as prejudice
against the mentally ill. He asserts that: "Sanism is as insidious as other 'isms' [like racism and
sexism] and is, in some ways, more troubling, since it is (1) largely invisible, (2) largely socially
acceptable, and (3) frequently practiced (consciously and unconsciously) by individuals who
regularly take 'liberal' or 'progressive."' Id. at 24.
6. Karen Guiduli, Challenges for the Mentally Ill. The 'Threat to Safeoy" Defense Standard and the
Use of Pychotropic Medication Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1149,1158 (1996).
7. Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternaism, Civil Commitment and Illness Politics: Assessing the Current
Debate and Outining a Future Direction, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 131, 144 (1993).
8. Id. at 145.
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rely on expert testimony of physicians and mental health professionals to
make a determination of (in)sanity,9 the likely result is complicity of courts
with doctors in the mantra of "better to be safe than sorry."10
This Note will consider the possibility of a different legal approach that
gives individuals with mental illness broader rights to make their own medical
decisions. More broadly, it will examine the impact of the legal structure in
shaping the identity of the mentally ill. To this end, I will explore issues that
appear persistently problematic in the legal realm for individuals with mental
illness. I will use the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court case, Steele v. Hamilton Counoy
Community Health Boardn l to highlight many of the difficult and provocative
issues that arise when courts consider the lives, rights, and identities of indi-
viduals with mental illness. I will also draw from the 2001 Montana Supreme
Court case, In the Matter of the Mental Health ofK G.F.12 as an example of a deci-
sion that looks at mental illness in a more progressive manner, taking into
account more than Western medicine's insight, and is therefore an example of
a case heading in the direction that I will advocate for in this Note. The Steele
case clearly depicts the law's blind adherence to the medical model and its
effect on the identity of its litigants by the rights it grants, the legal principles
it applies, and the voices and opinions the court deems meritorious. The
KG.F. case juxtaposes the Steele opinion, and demonstrates some of the con-
siderations of a court that is conscious of society's implicit sanist bias. 13 These
two cases provide compelling stories through which to view many complex
and difficult questions: How do courts shape the identities of mentally ill liti-
gants? How could alternative arguments and models improve the interaction
between the law and individuals with mental illness? What is at stake for the
lives of the mentally ill, whether their liberty is restricted or not?
The concepts of autonomy and liberty are fundamental to the discussion
of why, which, and whether rights should be afforded to mentally ill individu-
als. It is a theme that runs throughout cases and legal scholarship concerning
individuals with mental illness. Those living with mental illness are of particu-
lar interest due to the real risk to personal liberty that many of these individu-
als face under the law. Far from finding a world that is structured to be readily
accessible to them, those who identify (or are identified) as mentally ill may be
9. Id. at 143.
10. Id. at 145.
11. Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10 (Ohio 2000).
12. In re K.G.F, 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001).
13. Professor Perlin has discussed this case as well, looking specifically at the Montana
Supreme Court's progressive approach to the standard for counsel in involuntary commitment
hearings, but stating also that "the [K.G.F.] decision remains the exception to the usual prac-
tice. K.G.F. has only been cited once outside of Montana, and in that case, the Washington
Court of Appeals took issue with the K.G.F. court's [opinion]." Michael L. Perlin, And My Best
Fnend, My Doctor Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 735, 741 (2005).
Thus, while KG.E. is very useful as a tool for analysis, it does not represent a legal trend.
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involuntarily institutionalized,14 denied the right to. vote, 15 afforded less pro-
tection than individuals with physical disabilities under the ADA,16 and forced
to take psychotropic drugs to be rendered competent to stand trial. 17 The use
of psychotropic medication 18 is an issue that uniquely faces the mentally ill.
While all medications have the potential to alter the state of the user in some
way, this class of drugs is meant to change thoughts, behavior, and emotions,
which are all, in theory, affected by symptoms of mental illness. 19 These same
thoughts, behavior, and emotions are also at the heart of what it is to be hu-
man and their expression in an individual is central to personal identity.
Of course, many justifications are proffered for such intrusions made in
the name of the law, from public safety to the state's interest in prosecuting
individuals for crimes. Such justifications, however, are not so black-and-
white.20 Moreover, there are clear risks of the state having such broad author-
ity over the rights of the mentally ill besides risks to individual liberty; by al-
lowing the medical model to speak for the mentally ill, they are denied valid
identities in the eyes of the law. Since mental illness affects mental processes,
is the true person simply masked by the illness, or do antipsychotics medicate
individuals who simply view the world through a different lens, forcing them
to assimilate to conventional mental processes? If the latter is true, is it ethical
to take a hands-off approach to the mentally ill, or would this simply be giving
mentally ill individuals the "right to rot"?21 Shouldn't we listen to those who
live with mental illness before traveling down either path? In order to chal-
lenge the current legal view, the interaction of individuals with mental illness
and the law must be examined from the perspective that has been neglected
by the law thus far; that is, from those who live with mental illness. Accord-
ingly, my analysis will center around the voices of these individuals.
This Note sets out to do the following. First, it will lay out the ground-
work for my critique of the law's approach to the mentally ill. I offer a brief
historical account of such treatment and some of the problematic medical
issues, focusing on the ways in which law compromises the rights of the men-
14. Arrigo, supra note 7, at 142.
15. Judi Chamberlin, CifiZenship Rights and Pychiatric Disabiity, 21 PSYCHIATRIC
REHABILITATION J. 405, 405 (1998); Kay Schriner, Lisa A. Ochs & Todd G. Shields, The Last
Suffrage Movement: Voting Rights for Persons with Cognitive and Emotional Disabiiies, 27 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 75, 75 (1997).
16. Guiduli, supra note 6, at 1158.
17. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
18. The term "psychotropic medication" encompasses antidepressants, antimanics,
antianxiety medication, and antipsychotics. See Guiduli, supra note 6, at 1160-61.
19. Brendan D. Kelly, Structural Violence and Schizophrenia, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 721, 722
(2005).
20. Professor Perlin argues that mental illness law is pretextual in its application. He ar-
gues that "the mental disability law system often deprives individual of liberty disingenuously
and for reasons that have no relationship to case law or to statutes." PERLIN, supra note 4 at 27
(emphasis added).
21. Arrigo, supra note 7, at 133.
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tally ill. Next, it will offer a critical account of the medical model of mental
illness, examining how medicine and the judiciary currently frame the legal
rights and identity of individuals with mental illness. I then discuss the con-
cept of the social model and how it may account for mental illness. I will draw
upon the disability scholars and advocates of the patient movement to evalu-
ate an alternative framework for shaping the legal and social identities of the
mentally ill. Throughout the preceding parts, I will turn to the Steele and
KG.F. cases as illustrative narratives in the analysis.
Finally, I conclude by considering the application of the social model of
disability to the law in the context of mental illness. Through the application
of the social model, I argue that we can get beyond the dichotomy of hands-
on or hands-off in the law's role in the lives of mental illness by using a more
complete and nuanced approach. Beyond the black and white landscape of the
medical model, the social model will allow lawyers and judges to confront the
social inequalities facing individuals with mental illness, ensuring that these
citizens have identities and therefore dignity in the eyes of the law.
I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEBATE: LEGAL HISTORY AND MEDICAL
BACKGROUND
The history of the law's regulation of the lives of individuals with mental
illness in the United States sheds light on the intent and purpose of these legal
interventions. Significantly, the state has frequently invoked parens patriae
power in legal interactions with individuals with mental illness. In contrast to
police power, which is invoked to protect society at large, a state's rights as
parens patriae are deeply rooted in paternalism,22 allowing it to make decisions
that protect an individual according to what the state thinks she needs. Origi-
nally utilized to protect the property rights of heirs of "idiots and lunatics" in
English law, parens pariae has since been extended to include a state's duty to
protect the insane from themselves. 23 For example, in the Steele case, this pro-
tection came in the form of involuntary commitment and forced medication, a
serious interference with liberty; indeed criminal law sets the evidenciary bar at
"beyond a reasonable doubt" to ensure that no individuals unjustly suffer only
the intrusion of imprisonment. But, there are real world implications of living
with mental illness that could be alleviated by large-scale medical intervention,
paternalistic though it may be. For example, schizophrenic individuals have
high rates of homelessness in comparison to the general population in many
countries, 24 and are also over-represented in prison populations.2 5 Neverthe-
less, statistics must be differentiated from inevitabilites. The disproportionate
use of the states'parenspatriae power in cases involving individuals with mental
22. Id at 137.
23. Id.
24. Kelly, supra note 19, at 724.
25. Id. at 725-26.
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illness exposes the law's assumption that the mentally ill must be more heavily
regulated than the sane. The question is, then, to what (or whose) end?
The success of traditional medical treatment for mental illness is ques-
tionable, making the link between medical intervention and quality of life for
the mentally ill tenuous at best. The Lester and Tritter study, in which authors
drew from interviews with multiple focus groups of between five and twelve
people with serious mental illness, ranging from serious depression to psycho-
ses such as schizophrenia, suggests not only that drugs are not as effective as
one may presume, but that the mental health structure in general may be in-
appropriate for the needs of individuals with mental illness. 26 Psychiatric pa-
tient participants complained of their healthcare providers not believing them
that drugs negatively impacted their quality of life.27 In fact, users reported
serious side effects such as severe exhaustion, with one person reporting a
need for thirteen hours of sleep a night due to medication.28 Another partici-
pant suffered lockjaw as a result of his psychotropic drug prescription, and
reported doctors simply told him that he would "get over it."29 There was also
stress associated with seeking treatment, from busy waiting rooms aggravating
symptoms of anxiety,30 to the fear of being "outed" as a psychiatric patient by
fellow community members.31 When they do seek treatment for mental ill-
ness individuals face, daunting possibilities of social stigma, debilitating side
effects of treatment, involuntary confinement, and even denial of the right to
vote in the majority of states.32 Thus, not only does a paternalistic approach to
the mentally ill deprive these individuals of important liberties, but the protec-
tion or help that paternalistic intervention provides may do more harm than
good.
II. MEDICAL MODEL IN THE COURTS: WHY ARE JUDGES AND DOCTORS ON
THE SAME TEAM?
The law has largely adopted the medical model in its approach to indi-
viduals with mental illness. This model follows the framework accepted within
Western medicine that treats impairment as an individual's malfunction, call-
ing for a treatment or a cure. Medical doctors speak for people with mental
illness in the legal realm, since the medical model holds that the thoughts,
behavior and words of the mentally ill are symptoms of disease and not the
legitimate sentiments of that person.33
26. Helen Lester & Jonathan Q. Tritter, 'listen to My Madness" Understanding the Experience
of People with Serious Mental Illness, 27 Soc. HEALTH & ILLNESS 649, 649-69 (2005).
27. Id. at 658.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 661.
31. Id. at 659.
32. Schriner et al., supra note 15, at 76.
33. Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ohio 2000).
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The case of Steele v. Hamilton provides a useful factual framework to illus-
trate the unspoken and unchallenged use of the medical model in the law.
Jeffrey Steele's encounter with the law was shaped by the medical model from
the beginning. Mr. Steele is an adult man, diagnosed with paranoid schizo-
phrenia, who was deemed to have no right to refuse antipsychotic medication
despite the fact that his psychiatrists agreed that he posed no imminent danger
to himself or others. 34 Mr. Steele was taken to a state hospital by a police offi-
cer after his family reported that he was "seeing things and trying to fight
imaginary foes." 35 A hospital physician assessed Mr. Steele and determined
that he needed to be hospitalized for treatment of psychosis. 36 Three days
after his arrival at the facility, a physician, Dr. Rohs, filed an affidavit with the
probate court that concluded that Mr. Steele most likely suffered from para-
noid schizophrenia. 37 This psychiatric diagnosis, that is the perhaps question-
able label of schizophrenic, 38 laid the groundwork for his involuntary com-
mitment.
The case went up to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that a state
may exercise its parenspatriae power to justify forced administration of antipsy-
chotic medication to a non-dangerous, committed mentally ill patient, over-
turning a prior case that held the contrary.39 The Court further modified Ohio
case law by holding that a mental patient would no longer have to be adjudi-
cated incompetent to receive antipsychotic medication against his or her will,
but instead would only have to be found specifically incompetent to make a
medical decision.40
The medical model presumes that the problem arises within the patient,
and therefore the focus is on the cure, i.e. alleviating symptoms of the diag-
nosed disorder. In the case of mental health, the treatment often means psy-
chotropic drugs.41 In the Steele case, it is implicit that the Court perceives Mr.
Steele's difficulties to be within his own body; there is no discussion of the
social obstacles that he must endure as a schizophrenic person. The opinion




38. The use of the label "schizophrenic" has recently been criticized for its overbroad
application and stigmatizing effect. BBC News quoted Richard Bentall, Professor of Experi-
mental Clinical Psychology at the University of Manchester, as stating. "We do not doubt there
are people who have distressing experiences such as hearing voices or paranoid fears. But the
concept of schizophrenia is scientifically meaningless. It groups together a whole range of
different problems under one label --the assumption is that all of these people with all of these
different problems have the same brain disease." Schizophrenia Term Use 'Invalid', BBC
NEws, Oct. 9, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6033013.stm (last visited November
1,2007).
39. Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 18 (Ohio 2000).
40. Id. at 20. (holding that the standard would be one of clear and convincing evidence
that the patient lacks the capacity to give or withhold informed consent involving treatment).
41. Lester & Tritter, supra note 26, at 650.
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came down on December 18, 2000, and we are told in the statement of the
facts that Mr. Steele was first committed on July 26, 1997.42 No mention is
made of the almost three and a half years that Mr. Steele was involuntarily
committed. The Court, although recognizing that Mr. Steele is non-dangerous,
non-suicidal, and non-disruptive in general, nonetheless points to his own
refusal to accept a "cure" as the circumstance that precludes his release, rather
than questioning the system that would hold such a person against his will for
such a prolonged duration.43
The Steele opinion demonstrates the medical model's inability to conceive
of a mentally ill individual as having a valid identity that includes his or her
mental illness. In Steele, the magistrate found that Mr. Steele's schizophrenia
"resulted in 'a substantial disorder of thought [that] grossly impair[ed] his be-
havior and judgment." '44 This statement spells out the court's opinion that
Mr. Steele's expressions were not, in and of themselves, to be taken as authen-
tic or legitimate, but were viewed as skewed by his affliction. Moreover, the
magistrate made his findings upon the testimony of three psychiatrists, 45 re-
vealing the unquestioning acceptance of the medical model as a neutral
framework. Interestingly, there is evidence that the psychiatric community saw
the Steele case as a substantial victory in that the law adopted psychiatry's own
view of mental illness. Former chair of the APA's Commission on Public Pol-
icy, Litigation, and Advocacy, Richard Ciccone, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist
and Director of the Psychiatry and Law Program at the University of Roches-
ter,46 said that he was "impressed with the judges' insightful approach to men-
tal illness and its treatment in Steele v. Hamilton, adding that this decision
should "send a message to psychiatrists in other states that we must clearly
articulate the facts about mental illness, and when we do, judges will get the
message." 47
Paternalism in the law, such as use ofparenspatriae by the courts, is facili-
tated by the medical model, which silences the voices of the mentally ill and
presumes that only a non-mentally ill identity is sufficiently legitimate to retain
full autonomy.48 The justification for invocation of parenspatriae is that a per-
son is unable to care for himself.49 After this judgment, rendered upon medi-
42. Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 13.
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Richard Ciccone's curriculum vitae, available at
http://www.urmc.rochester.edu/smd/psych/fac-staff/ciccone-richard.html.
47. Ken Hausman, Legal News: State Can Foriby Medicate Nonviolent Patients, Court Rules,
PSYCHIATRIC NEWs, Jan. 5 2001, at 8.
48. See id.
49. See Arrigo, supra note 7, at 137; see also Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health
Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 19 (Ohio 2000) ("A state's parenspatiae power allows it to care for citizens
who are unable to take care of themselves.") (citing Addington v. Tex., 441 U.S. 418, 426
(1979)).
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cal opinion, the court will balance the benefits of the involuntary treatment
sought with side effects of such treatment.50 Since the courts rely upon testi-
mony of physicians,51 benefits and side effects are judged in the medical
sense,52 and social "side effects" and potential benefits of abstaining from
intervention are neglected. The Steele case depicts how the sanist tradition
prevails, and how the medical model provides yet another vehicle for the law's
heavy hand to constrain the choices of mentally ill litigants.
The Court in Steele conceded that police power, which may be invoked to
protect public safety and welfare, could not be asserted absent a finding of
imminent danger to self or others.5 3 Therefore, it invoked its parens patriae
power. On its face, the use ofparenspatriae to regulate the mentally ill is clearly
paternalistic and thus directly impinges on personal autonomy in an obvious
way. On the other hand, proponents of the medical model might argue that
forced treatment vindicates the interests of the "sane" Mr. Steele who would
appear with drug treatment. While no claims can be made on the likelihood,
perhaps once forcibly medicated, Mr. Steele would opt to continue his treat-
ment.5 4 Whose truth is more important, in this case, that of Mr. Steele pre-
medication, or that of a hypothetically cooperative and satisfied Mr. Steele
post-medication? Does this argument delve too far into the unknowable to
justify a type of affirmative legal prevention that is not generally imposed on
the population?
What about the argument that the medical model is protecting individu-
als with mental illness from themselves? As stated above, the mentally ill are
over-represented in populations such as among the homeless, and surely many
other grim statistics are available. Patient rights activist and psychiatric survi-
vor55 Judi Chamberlin points out that paternalistic oppression of the mentally
50. See Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 21 ("The additional findings required by our holding, i.e.
whether the medication is in the patient's best interest and whether a less intrusive treatment
would be as effective . ").
51. Arrigo, supra note 7, at 143.
52. See Hausman, supra note 47, at 8.
53. Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 19; Arrigo, supra note 7, at 136.
54. In a footnote to the case, the Court states that "the question of forcing [Mr. Steele] is
now moot because he is voluntarily taking antipsychotic medications." Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 21
n.8. The Court adds if Mr. Steele were to refuse in the future, an action to force administration
of the medication would be reasonable. In spite of Mr. Steele's acceptance of drugs, the Court
states that there is no evidence in the record to suggest that he has recovered or been released
from the treatment center. Id.
55. I use the tide "psychiatric survivor" based on Chamberlin's own preference for the
terminology. I take it to indicate Chamberlin's own agency and identity, and in turn life dealing
with psychiatry and her own mental health, and not a reference to a state of being cured or past
psychiatric treatment. This preference is much like the preference for the term "domestic vio-
lence survivor" on the part of advocates and feminists over "bartered woman" or "victim of
domestic violence," not necessarily because a survivor does not, or will never, experience do-
mestic violence, but instead as reflective of her life as someone who has endured domestic
violence, instead of a passive receiver of abuse.
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ill may purport to look out for the safety of such individuals, but even if it is
accomplishing that, it is not balancing the very real and important concern of
the right of these- individuals to pursue happiness, 6 which may not be achiev-
able if their liberty is so paternalistically impinged upon. As Chamberlin elo-
quently reminds us: "[t]he struggle for freedom has always been seen by the
powerful as a denial of the obvious truth of superiority of the rulers. 57 This
rings true all the more when one considers the rhetoric of protection of the
mentally ill in other contexts. Police officers do not pre-imprison individuals
with a high likelihood of criminal behavior in hopes of teaching a lesson be-
fore real harm is done, nor can a court order involuntary medical treatment
for a condition such as cancer based on the premise the subject will be hap-
pier in the long run. These things are simply not done - it is not illegal for an
adult to act against her own best interest.
The murky concept of autonomy is enshrined in our Bill of Rights, and
concerns about potential violations of autonomy are central to the application
of law under the medical model. Thus, the interpretation of autonomy dictates
the ways in which the law restrains and shapes the lives, and thus identities, of
individuals with mental illness. 58 When looking at cases like Steele that involve
forcing the court's will on a person, it is clear that the law has intruded upon
that individual's personal autonomy to at least some degree.
Patient activist and psychiatric survivor Judi Chamberlin asserts that a
value central to autonomy is that an adult may "make choices that diverge
from social norms or expectations, so long as those choices do not bring the
individual into conflict with established civil or criminal law."59 It is possible,
however, to conceive of this intervention as actually protecting autonomy, if
credence is given to the medical model. That is, if one believes that the true
self lies beneath the symptoms of mental illness, then court intervention
which mandates treatment, be it medication, therapy, or even involuntary
institutionalization, would aim to help the underlying self realize autonomy by
freeing it from the symptoms which alter its decision-making process. The
focus on autonomy looks at whether the state's interference in the lives of the
mentally ill truly represents an erosion of personal liberty. That is, the idea of
autonomy assumes that there is a kernel of truth within an individual and that
if we can get to this truth, we will know what the right answer is.6° This idea is
only useful under the black and white assumptions of the medical model; that
is diseases versus sane, medicated or unmedicated. It is, however, far to sim-
plistic with respect to the mentally ill.
56. Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 406-07.
57. Id. at 406.
58. JUDITH LYNN FAILER, WHO QUAUIHES FOR RIGHTS? 57-58 (2002).
59. Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 405.
60. For a critique of the wisdom of mandatory autonomy in the field of bioethics, see CARL
E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1998).
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In this view, the paternalistic protection invoked by the state would fos-
ter the ability of these individuals to better live within society as it is struc-
tured. But this is precisely where the medical model fails. It confronts the
following conundrum: should we protect the autonomy of persons with men-
tal illness by allowing them to do what they want, or should the law, presum-
ing that we know what is best for their health and well-being, dispense with
consent? This is frequently referred to as the "right to cure" versus "right to
refuse" debate.61 It arises because of the medical model's understanding of a
mentally ill individual as someone who is objectively dysfunctional. I will re-
turn to this crucial point in my discussion of the application of the social
model, and how it could bring us out of this paradox by reframing the ques-
tion from intervention or status quo, to a more complete account that digni-
fies the identity of the individual.
The medical model also affects the quality of court proceedings. In the
Steele case, the Court relied exclusively on the expert testimony of three psy-
chiatrists in finding that Mr. Steele was in fact insane.62 Furthermore, the
Court stated that it would not require a full adjudication of incompetence in
forced medication cases in the future, but would instead require a showing of
the patient's specific incompetence to give or withhold informed consent. 63
While the Court asserts that by not adjudicating the incompetence issue, it is
avoiding use of an onerous procedure that, if successful, would curtail a wide
range of rights belonging to the mentally ill individual in question, 64 I am quite
suspicious about such tidy justification. The ability to give or refuse valid in-
formed consent relies on a patient's ability take in all relevant information, and
then she must apply that information to the situation at hand. In the Steele
case, testimony came from three psychiatrists, all of whom concurred that Mr.
Steele was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, but that he was not an im-
mediate danger to himself or others.65 The psychiatrists testified that Mr.
Steele lacked the capacity to give or withhold informed consent, that the
medication was the only effective treatment for his illness, that the benefits of
medication outweighed costs of side effects, and that his illness prevented his
release from the hospital.66 In light of the realities of court proceedings implic-
itly dictated by the medical model, meaning that the judge is listening often
exclusively to testimony from medical doctors it is nearly impossible to imag-
ine a case wherein a doctor testifies that someone like Mr. Steele made a deci-
sion that suggests the ability to give valid informed consent. That is, asking a
doctor, who by hypothesis believes that mental illness is a condition that can
be treated with medication, whether a patient who is refusing treatment has
61. JUDITH LYNN FAILER, WHO QUALIFIES FOR RIGHTS? 138-41 (2002).
62. Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health BcL, 736 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ohio 2000).
63. Id. at 19-20.
64. Id at 19.
65. Id at 14.
66. Id.
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properly weighed all of the information at hand to make an informed decision
seems like an odd, if not entirely disingenuous, procedure.
Since doctors conceive of mental illness as an individual malfunction re-
quiring a medical, generally chemical, cure, a vision of a valid identity of a
person like Mr. Steele is effectively precluded. If an individual's thoughts,
perceptions and preferences are mere manifestations of a disease that the in-
dividually is reversibly afflicted with, the illness is simply a distortion of the
real person beneath it. The reliance on medical doctors within the law, as ex-
pert witnesses or for guidance in the legislative process, then necessarily in-
fuses many aspects of the medical model into the legal construction of indi-
viduals with mental illness. This view unchallenged purports to do justice for
individuals like Mr. Steele by advocating for their "sane selves" that are ren-
dered unable to communicate because of mental disease. This view, however,
is sharply challenged outside legal discourse by both academics and activists.
If this alternative viewpoint has merit, then and justice is compromised when
substantive arguments are omitted in litigation.
The medical profession is without a doubt entitled to pursue what it be-
lieves to be legal justice through such advocacy. But it also goes without say-
ing that the law is not merely an extension of science but a rich and complex
body of thought unto itself. When, as in the case of individuals with mental
illness, courts appear to be wearing the hat of another profession, it is neces-
sary to question the law's allegiance to ensure that it is society, and not an elite
group of medical doctors, that benefits from its process.
III. THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITIES AND MENTAL ILLNESS
Though the courts favor the medical model's of mental illness, it has
been sharply challenged by many scholars, who argue that the mentally ill are
more fairly accounted for within the social model of disability. 67 The social
model demedicalizes disability by distinguishing impairments, caused by fac-
tors such as genetics or disease, from the social barriers that turn the impair-
ment into a disability. 68 While the medical model understands disability as a
dysfunction arising within the individual, the social model looks at a world
structured for a specifically-abled subset of the population, and thus views the
problem as existing in social structures and not in the individual who encoun-
ters a world unprepared to accommodate her.69 There is significant tension
67. Elizabeth J. Donaldson, The Corpus of the Madwoman: Toward a Feminist Disabiliy Studies
Tbeogy of Embodiment and Mental Illness, 14 NWSA J. 99, 111 (2002); Lester & Tritter, supra note
26, at 650-51.
68. Lester & Tritter, supra note 26, at 651.
69. Id. at 653-54. See also Mary Crossley, The Disabilioy Kaleidoscope, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
621, 653-57 (1999) for further discussion of the definition of the social model of disability: In
contrast to the medical model of disability, which views disadvantages as flowing naturally from
a defect located in an individual, the social model of disability sees disadvantages as flowing
from social systems and structures. Because members of society historically have not viewed
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among disability scholars as to the inclusion of mentally ill individuals within
the discourse of the disability movement.70 Those who advocate for the men-
tally ill, however, point out that these individuals suffer from many of the
same obstacles that all disabled people face, from social stigma to employment
barriers, and argue that they deserve full legitimacy as well. 71 It is perhaps the
invisibility of mental illness, which affects the way one feels, thinks or per-
ceives, in contrast to the outward stigma associated with a physical impair-
ment, that accounts for the sometimes outsider status of the mentally ill
within disability discourse. 72 Whether or not people with mental illness fit
neatly into the disabilities discourse, their unique issues merit discussion as
they undeniably face substantial difficulties in comparison to non-mentally ill
people. They should have the same legal protection, at least in theory, as peo-
ple with other types of disabilities under statutes such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act.73
Scholars have used the position of the cognitively impaired within dis-
ability discourse, using it to examine the social model's premise that many
differences often labeled as inferior are in fact valuable existences that repre-
sent diversity, not malfunction. Though cognitive disabilities are distinct from
mental illness in many ways,74 cognitive impairment may provide a useful
analogy to mental illness. Individuals with mental illness do share some traits
with the cognitively impaired, such as a history of isolation and institutionali-
zation. Moreover, both groups have unique capacities for understanding the
world around them in comparison to the so-called norm. Given these similari-
ties, the framing of the cognitively impaired within the social model may be
useful in conceptualizing individuals with mental illness within the model.
Advocates of the social model have analogized Down Syndrome to gen-
der in order to blur the lines of correctness versus defect in humans. In earlier
times, being a woman was a condition thought to leave the afflicted wrought
with physical weakness and frailty of the mind. 75 While sexism certainly per-
sists, it is no longer medically valid to conceive of a female as genetically infe-
rior. Thus, this analogy gave rise to the argument that Down Syndrome has
persons with disabilities as part of the societal norm, no attempts have been made to avoid the
creation of physical and attitudinal barriers built into the very framework of society - barriers
that prevent persons with disabilities from fully participating in society. Thus, the disadvantaged
status of persons with disabilities is the product of a hostile (or at least inhospitable) social
environment, not simply the product of bodily defects. Id. (citations omitted).
70. Lester & Tritter, supra note 26, at 653.
71. Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 405; Schriner et al., sapra note 15.
72. Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 405.
73. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
74. For example, cognitive impairments may have more clear phenotypic markers and
onset of impairment is typically at birth, whereas onset of mental illness may not occur until
adulthood.
75. Sophia Isako Wong, At Home with Down Syndrome and Gender, 17 HYPATIA 89, 98
(2002).
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the potential to be transformed in a similar manner to gender if it were re-
framed as a concededly different, but natural and valid state, as many scholars
argue that it is.76 Could this argument extend to mental illness as well?
In the case of Mr. Steele, this would require asking whether his state as a
paranoid schizophrenic person represents a natural and valuable state of dif-
ference within humanity, legitimating his identity as a schizophrenic individ-
ual, instead of a disease that necessitates a cure. Mental illness certainly occurs
naturally, but the real issue becomes whether or not it can be conceived of as
a state that does not need rectification. In contrast to Down Syndrome, which
is not alterable, mental illness can be treated with medication that can thereby
changing the mentally ill individual's thoughts and behaviors and rendering
her, by medical standards, normal. The idea of curing mental illness becomes
quite problematic in light of the serious side effects that frequently accompany
consumption of antipsychotic drugs, which may include nausea, headaches,
muscle stiffness and spasms, and the serious and incurable condition of
tardive dyskinesia, whose symptoms include involuntary movements of the
head, face, or extremities, and may affect up to twenty-five percent of pa-
tients. 77 In light of the fact that there is no way to treat a person with antipsy-
chotic medication without putting her health at great risk, mental illness could
be framed much like a cognitive impairment such as Down Syndrome. That
is, mental illness could be re-conceptualized within the social model as a non-
alterable state that is not objectively wrong but merely constructed as such.
Thus, if the social model were introduced in litigation, forced administration
of medication could be framed as drugging instead of treatment. This frame
offers a very different vantage point than the medical model, which would
have the court simply balance potential side effects against the state's interest
in medicating the mentally ill person at issue, as the Court did in Steele.78
Among social model proponents, the role of impairment has been hotly
contested. 79 Some argue that discussions of pain and limitations should be left
out so as to keep the focus on social structures, and off of the bodies of the
impaired. Many feminists, however, critique this view because it ignores the
reality that impairment does restrict activity.80 Silencing this part of the con-
versation could undermine the need for social care and accommodation. 81 For
example, in the case of Mr. Steele, should social model proponents focus
solely on the fact that a non-dangerous adult should be allowed to live free
from state intervention? Or should they also consider the fact that many of
his symptoms, including self-induced vomiting and the belief that he must
76. Id.
77. Guiduli, supra note 6, at 1185; Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd.,
736 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ohio 2000).
78. Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 17-18.
79. Lester & Tritter, supra note 26, at 651-52.
80. Id.
81. Id
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fend off enemies visible only to him, may well be terribly unpleasant for him?
I return to this issue in a discussion of the practical application of the social
model to mental illness in the law.
Another concept in the social model theory is that of embodiment, or
the elimination of the false dichotomy between mind and body, in favor fo-
cusing on how, in the case at hand, one lives mental illness. 82 The medical
model, on the other hand, implicitly rejects this concept by viewing an indi-
vidual with mental illness as having a sane mind that is separate from the dis-
ease. Chamberlin states that we must look at the whole cohesive package to
do justice to the individual: "Defining a person's difficulties as psychiatric is a
rejection of people's experiences. Psychiatric diagnosis ... den[ies] the real
meaning that supposedly dysfunctional behavior has to the individual." 83 Les-
ter and Tritter report that some patients with serious mental illness express
the importance of "owning" their impairment. They see mental illness as in-
trinsic to their unique identity, and report that they do not believe that they
should be presumed to have shameful feelings toward it.84 The Icarus Pro-
ject,85 a mental illness support group with a global network comprised primar-
ily of individuals with bipolar disorder, sees theirs as a "condition as a danger-
ous gift to be cultivated and taken care of rather than as a disease or disorder
needing to be 'cured' or 'eliminated."' 86
The concept of embodiment presents some difficulties in considering
the lives of mentally ill individuals. In the Steele case, Dr. Rohs reported that
Mr. Steele's history of "odd and paranoid behavior" included "refusing to eat
food prepared by his family, talking to himself, making threats to his family,
[and] forcing himself to throw up every morning. '87 While in the University
Hospital, Mr. Steele was withdrawn, neglected his hygiene, and refused medi-
cation.88 In the case of Jeffrey Steele, can a man suffering from delusions,
unable or unwilling to care for himself in very basic ways, be asked to embody
his illness in a useful way? He is clearly embodying it in a very literal sense. In
the Lester and Tritter study, authors report that living with mental illness was
"almost universally described as frightening." 89 Though the theory of em-
bodiment is centered on the idea of blurring the mind/body duality, it as-
sumes that one has the capacity to observe and reflect on oneself as a sort of
observer. If it did account for Mr. Steele, should we praise him for his flawless
embodiment, or do we find ourselves battling the gut reaction that his case
82. Id. at 653.
83. Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 407.
84. Lester & Tritter, supra note 26, at 658-59.
85. The Icarus Project, The Icarus Project: Navigating the Space Between Bril'ance and Madness,
http://www.theicarusproject.net (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
86. Icarus Project, Origins and Purpose, http://www.theicarusproject.net/icarus-
organizational/origins-and-purpose (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
87. Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ohio 2000).
88. Id.
89. Lester & Tritter, supra note 26, at 657.
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goes too far? I will return to this issue in the following section, wherein I will
discuss the potential for the practical application of the social model, which
need not and indeed should not lose sight of the potentially negative aspects of
mental illness if it is to work for people and not merely for theory's sake.
So, the question is what potential the social model has to interact with
the law to more appropriately and comprehensively represent the identity of
the mentally ill. Unlike the medical model, which conceives of the mentally ill
person as manifesting symptoms of a disease that obscures the true self that
lies beneath, the social model presents the possibility of an identity that em-
bodies the mental illness as one aspect of the self. This is not to say that the
presumption is refusal of medication. In a case like that of Jeffrey Steele,
where the individual with a mental illness at issue is despondent and unable to
fully communicate his personal preferences, it would not be prudent to as-
sume under the social model that every person with a mental illness would
refuse treatment. What the social model shows is that the voices of the men-
tally ill are silenced not because of the illness itself, but because of the very
medical model that renders them invisible as people with legitimate identities
until they are medicated.
IV. APPLYING THE SOCIAL MODEL TO MENTAL ILLNESS
A person may behave in ways that otherpeople can't understand, but in wys that
have meaning and value for that person in the context of his or her life. 90
The social model offers great promise as an alternative, and validating,
framework for the identities of individuals with mental illness that would give
such individuals ownership of their condition and resulting existence without
presuming that a life with mental illness lacks value simply because it is not
understandable by the non-mentally ill. In order to achieve justice for people
with mental illness, the social model must be applied in a practical and com-
plete manner, accounting for the full spectrum of factors that affect the lives
of the mentally ill, from the value of identity, stigma and social barriers, to
lived suffering and danger to oneself or others.
The debate should be less about what patients have a right to do or have
done to them and more about treating them in a way that will feel fair to the
very same patients - not theoretical fairness, but fairness on the ground. The
medical model, however, precludes this vision of fairness because of the fun-
damental conundrum they are placed in by the biomedical model, which con-
ceives of their voices as mere symptoms of a disease. Thus, the social model
affords a new lens through which to look at what's best for individuals with
mental illness: by looking and listening closely to their lived experiences, with-
out assuming that they are unable to express themselves in a meaningful way.
On the contrary, the social model's focus on societal barriers, such as stigma
90. Chamberlin, smpra note 15, at 407 (emphasis added).
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and institutional barriers, with an emphasis aspects of living with mental ill-
ness that have largely gone ignored in the law, such as the importance of em-
bodiment, gives respect and dignity to the voices of individuals with mental
illness. This alternative model can help the law learn from individual and or-
ganizational advocates to better understand mental illness, toward the ultimate
end of exposing and combating sanism in society, creating a world that is
more manageable and hospitable to this neglected and oppressed sector of the
population. This section endeavors to do just that, albeit in a cursory manner.
Its purpose is not to provide a comprehensive catalogue of every non-medical
consideration, but instead to ground the theory of the social model in the real
life of mental illness, to highlight its promise in the law and to suggest some
ways that the law, counsel and judges alike, can put the social model to use.
Though it deals with the narrow issue of the right to effective counsel
for defendants in involuntary commitment hearings, the KG.E. case provides
an excellent launching point for applying the social model to mental illness in
the law. Based on what it saw as historical and systemic inadequacies of legal
advocacy for the mentally ill due to societal and therefore judicial prejudice,
the Court held that the mentally ill merited heightened protection with respect
to the effective standard for appointed counsel.91 In this case, K.G.F. was a
voluntary inpatient in a Montana hospital who wanted to end her stay, and
was then met with a state petition to keep her there involuntarily.92 In evaluat-
ing the issue at hand as to how effective counsel must be in involuntary com-
mitment hearings, the Court held that it would not accept a standard for ef-
fective counsel in involuntary commitment cases that presumed effective repre-
sentation because such proceedings historically have a very low threshold for
advocacy on behalf of the (mentally ill) individual. The Court looks to its state
Constitution for guidance on the appropriate standard, holding that: Respect
for a person's dignity invokes Article II, Section 4, under this state's constitu-
tion, which provides that "dignity of the human being is inviolable. '93 In fo-
cusing on dignity, the Montana Supreme Court implicitly recognizes dignity's
absence in the law's interaction with the mentally ill. Though the term is an
elusive one, is seems here to point toward the over-arching flaw of the medi-
cal model, which silences those who live with mental illness, thereby depriving
them of an identity that incorporates their mental illness, in spite of the fact
that many of these individuals feel deeply marginalized and ignored by such
91. In r K.G.F, 29 P.3d 485, 494 (Mont. 2001).
92. Id. at 488. (Unfortunately, neither the trial nor the appellate decisions are published or
otherwise available, so the only facts available are those as outlined in the Montana Supreme
Court opinion).
93. Id. at 493 ("[Rlespect for the digwi of each individual--a fundamental right, protected
by Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution--demands that people have for themselves
the moral right and moral responsibility to confront the most fundamental questions about the
meaning and value of their own lives and the intrinsic value of life in general, answering to their
own consciences and convictions") (quoting Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999))
(emphasis added).
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treatment. Recognizing someone as fully human, not as a walking manifesta-
tion of symptoms is a denial of dignity at a very basic and intuitive level.
As for the issue of social barriers, especially that of stigma and sanism,
the Court in K.G.F. had some insightful discussion that merits consideration
in any cases wherein mental illness is a factor. It cited a California Supreme
Court case, holding that "[d]ue to the potentially 'socially debilitating' stigma
that results from the 'irrational fear of the mentally ill,' the court held that 'it is
implausible that a person labeled by the state as so totally ill could go about,
after his release, seeking employment, applying to schools, or meeting old
acquaintances with his reputation fully intact."' 94 The Court held, to this end,
that "[t]he use of such stereotypical labels--which, as numerous commentators
point out, helps create and reinforce an inferior second-class of citizens--is
emblematic of the benign prejudice individuals with mental illnesses face, and
which are, we conclude, repugnant to our state constitution."95 So, while the
Court in KG.E. did more contemplation than application of the social model,
as is the role of a Supreme Court, it is pedagogically useful in considering
what a trial court or legal counsel would focus on in a practical strategy to use
the social model.
To begin to use the knowledge and wisdom of advocates for greater
rights for the mentally ill, it is important to consider first their compelling
counterarguments to the ideas that underlie the use of the medical model,
such as benevolence toward or protection of the mentally ill, and the value -
or existence - of a "sane" mind beneath the mental illness. These voices argue
that the results of this legal philosophy strip them of an identity that they
value and embrace. 96 Judi Chamberlin states:
The fundamental question is this: Why do we take one group of people,
those labeled "mentally ill", and deny them basic rights? . . . I believe that my
views about choice ... are applicable to any person, regardless of label (or lack
of label), who can express his or her own wishes and desires, no matter how
irrational they may appear to others.97
The social model would account for voices such as Judi Chamberlin's. A
space within the law for the social model would offer a poignant and impor-
tant counter to the medical model by presenting a viewpoint, utterly neglected
by the medical model, that people with mental illness possess individual selves
that incorporate the mental illness as a part of them.
So, with all of the preceding taken into consideration, how would a court
go about applying the social model? That is, of course, a simple question with
a complex answer. The mentally ill have unique legal vulnerabilities in numer-
ous aspects of the law. They have been categorically neglected in international
94. KG.F., 29 P.3d at 494 (quoting Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979)).
95. K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 495 (citing generally to Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L.
REv. 373, 374 (1992)).
96. Chamberlin, supra note 15, at 406.
97. Id.
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human rights law, in spite of the growing trend of international protections
that have evolved since World War 11.98 A psychiatric label also has serious
implications in family law, especially in child custody proceedings and the
best-interests of the child standards that are used therein.99 Such a label can,
alternatively, have mitigating effects in a criminal law context, allowing a
criminal defendant to submit evidence about his or her mental state to better
explain the acts committed.10 These are only a handful of the many ways that
mental illness and/or a psychiatric label effect an individual's interaction with
the law.
If the law were to use the social model, it would hear the discontent, rea-
soning and knowledge from sources such as Judi Chamberlin and the Icarus
Project, and it could use these perspectives in order to improve these interac-
tions to ensure that they are not borne of ignorance nor prejudice. The law
would consider social structures, such as poverty, access to employment and
healthcare; it would contemplate non-medical forms of treatment and look for
non-medical experts to testify and inform the court; it would ensure a high
standard for appointed counsel in cases such as involuntary commitment
hearings. For example, in the family law context, a parent who has been given
a psychiatric label would benefit from the judge's education on the many
forms of treatment that may be successfully used in order to cope with mental
illness, such as diet and exercise,10' as well as peer and familial support.02 In
the criminal law realm, the social model could enhance our understanding of
the social obstacles that exacerbate the negative symptoms of mental illness so
that a mentally ill defendant has the best defense possible.
The Icarus Project, a group comprised of individuals that have been la-
beled as or identify as mentally ill, take the medical model to task, stating in no
uncertain terms that they value their own existence, and do not see their con-
ditions as simply diseases requiring treatments or cures, calling mental illness
instead a "dangerous gift.' 10 3 The Icarus Project seeks a world in which in-
formation about medical treatment is available regarding mental illness so that
the individual can make choices about how and what methods to use, stating to
their reader that: "You need to define for yourself what healthy means, what
an appropriate level of functioning is for you and your beliefs, and then try to
98. Dhir, supra note 3, at 182.
99. Emily J. Caplan, Pychiahic Diagnosis in the Legal System, in BIAS IN PSYCHIATRIC
DIAGNOSIS 49-50 (Paula J. Caplan & Lisa Cosgrove eds., 2004).
100. Id. at 51-52.
101. See, e.g., Nutrition Affects Outcome of Schizophrenia Therapy, OBESITY, FITN ESS & WELLNESS
WEEK, June 26, 2004, at 876.
102. See LINDAJ. MORRISON, TALKING BACK TO PSYCHIATRY 15-16 (2005) for a discussion
of self-help methods that have been embraced by many psychiatric survivors, such as peer
groups.
103. Id.; Icarus Project, Ongins andPurpose,
http://www.theicarusproject.net/icarus-organizational/origins-and-purpose (last visited Feb.
20, 2007).
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take what you can from any tradition...whether it's Western medicine of Chi-
nese herbs."10 4 The Icarus Project emphasizes getting sufficient sleep and
exercise, learning about and perhaps taking traditional medicines when
needed, and the importance of community and communication.10 5 This or-
ganization is not only a testament to a proud and cultivated group identity that
embraces mental illness, but is also a testament of survival and evolution of a
group of individuals that the law may deem ill and in need of medical treat-
ment.
Medication as a rule is not precluded under the social model; 0 6 it is
merely not privileged as a "cure" or as the gateway to the underlying "sane
self." To deny the positive potential for drugs would ignore the experiences of
people who live with mental illness. For example, Beate Braun, a woman di-
agnosed as schizophrenic who has spoken about her experiences with mental
illness and mental health treatment, reports that she currently uses psychiatric
drugs as one aspect of her recovery methods. 07 To this end, the medical
model could remain useful to inform a course of medical treatment, if drugs
are incorporated into an individual's treatment plan. However, Braun reports
that she also utilizes, among others, peer support, one-on-one therapy, medi-
tation, activism, exercise in order to lead a healthy life. 08 Ms. Braun says of
her use of medication that "[r]ight now, my dose of Risperdal is not too
much. ... I take a walk with my dog, to hold the drugs as low as possible. I
don't drink of smoke, or take other drugs anymore either, which helps."'1 09
104. The Icarus Project, Taking Charge of Our Mental Health,
http://www.theicarusproject.net/artides/taking-charge-of-our-mental-health-committing-to-
taking-care-of-ourselves (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
105. Id.
106. See e.g., MORRISON, supra note 102, at 157-59. Morrison discusses the complexity of the
subject of psychiatric medication within the consumer/survivor/ex-patient movement in chap-
ter six, entitled "The Politics of Identity, Power and Knowledge." She brings up the hard line
stance in opposition to all medication espoused by some in favor of greater rights for the men-
tally ill, while others see medication as a useful treatment tool. However, she states that in spite
of these sometimes divisive differences in viewpoints, "[t]heir common goal of achieving voice for
consumers and survivors and ex-patients, rather than being spoken for by others, ultimately trumps
their competing views of the appropriate relations with psychiatry." Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
107. MindFreedom International, Personal Stories, http://mindfreedom.org/personal-
stories/braunbeate/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2006). MindFreedom International is a nonprofit
organization that unites both individuals and other grassroots organizations in order to fight for
rights in the mental health system.
108. Id
109. Id Beate Braun spent about ten years of her life in and out of mental hospitals, and
had been out of any such facilities for two years at the time of her interview in 2002. While in
the hospital, she was forcibly medicated, endured serious side effects, and reports to have been
ignored by her doctor when reporting her difficulty with the side effects. Of her encounters
with the law, Braun reflects: "One of the sad things is, they couldn't have done what they did to
me without the state's approval. They had to get approval from a judge to force these drugs on
me." Id. While Ms. Braun lives in Germany, her story mirrors that of many psychiatric survivors
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Applying the social model in the real world would incorporate a holistic vision
of what constitute treatment options.
In the case of Mr. Steele, testimony framed in the social model of disabil-
ity, whether from academics, psychiatric survivors or patient rights activists,
would have brought many factors into view that the Court did not consider.
For example, it may have looked more critically at how Mr. Steele's isolation
in the mental institution aggravated some of his symptoms, thus considering
how social structures may play a large part in creating the problems that are
then purportedly alleviated by more state intervention in the form of forced
medical treatment. This type of analysis would complicate the seemingly clear
decision rendered in the name of helping such individuals, and would limit the
court's ability to reasonably decide such cases under a blind adherence to the
medical model.
Even in the brief filed on behalf of Mr. Steele, his counsel did not argue
that a person who was not dangerous to himself or others had a right to live
his life with mental illness.110 Thus, Mr. Steele's own advocacy took the medi-
cal model as a given, depriving him of even a discussion of his rights as a valid
person without medical intervention. Steps should be taken to challenge the
medical model in court, perhaps with more diverse expert witnesses, to get
beyond a vision that distinguishes a person from her mental illness, and to-
wards the possibility of an individual with a valid identity that includes her
mental illness. An analysis of the social model of disabilities frames many im-
portant issues that come to bear outside of the medical model, and offers a
vision of what arguments should be considered in the legal realm, in cases
such as Steele, in order to provide a more balanced discussion of the appropri-
ate relationship between the state and citizens with mental illness.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that mental illness is a serious issue. Neither patient
rights activists nor medical doctors would dispute that. What is at issue is
whether or not the law provides a fair and accurate account of individuals
with mental illness when it relies on the medical model in framing the issues.
Many scholars as well as activist groups such as the Icarus Project would argue
that it does not. The social model could proffer a strong counter to limit the
use of paternalistic forces, such as the invocation of parenspatriae by the state.
It could also get us out of the puzzle created by the medical model, in which
the argument focuses on treatment or no treatment, by framing the issues
around legitimating and protecting the identities of the mentally ill. Incorpora-
in the United States, in terms of her reported side effects, feelings of being ignored, as well as
discontent with the law's role in the process.
110. Brief for Appellee at 2-12, Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736
N.E.2d 10 (Ohio 2000) (No. 99-1771). See Perlin, supra note 13, for greater discussion on the
inadequacy of counsel in involuntary commitment cases.
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tion of the social model into legal discourse would broaden the considerations
considered by courts and legislatures in determining what course of action to
take, and would blur the lines around the labels of "mental illness" to better
treat those so-designated as complete entities, and not people simply wearing
a mask of a disease.
By looking at mental illness as an identity that deserves to be legitimated
under the law, instead of merely a disease that can and should be cured, the
state's interest in health and safety will be fairly balanced. If the law becomes
informed with through the social model, the voices of the mentally ill and
other patient rights advocates will be heard, and the law will both do accom-
plish justice for the individual, as well as confront the pervasive prejudice
against the mentally ill by not silencing them. I do not envision the application
of the social model as psychiatry vs. anti-psychiatry. Instead, use of this nu-
anced and complex framework this is about unmasking an unjustified preju-
dice against a group of people that is couched in terms of science; not about
rejecting science altogether. Thus, while using the social model would not
preclude drug use, it would not equate drugs with a cure, and it would look at
an incompatible world, and not brain chemistry, as the central problem.
Most importantly, challenging what courts and legislators claim to know
about mental illness would give a voice and face to those who actually live
with mental illness. The total medicalization of mental illness does not offer a
space for individuals with mental illness that choose to embrace their identi-
ties and control their destinies. By listening to those who live with this condi-
tion, who have these "dangerous gifts," we make it possible for them to gain
visibility and community, which is a necessary step to fight the undercurrent
of stigma that silences them. We may find that forced administration of antip-
sychotic medication is all too often a manifestation of a society that fears and
pities these individuals. It would certainly not foreclose circumstances where
involuntary treatment of some sort was necessary. But it would treat individu-
als with mental illness as complex and whole, better protecting their rights as
individuals with a discernible identity, with the ability to define life and health
in a way that is right for them.
